U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minster Sanae Takaichi (Photo source: White House)

U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minster Sanae Takaichi (Photo source: White House)

【PRI】Who Makes an Alliance Work? Personal Chemistry at the Top and the Diplomats Behind It
English text appears of this post appears at the bottom of this post.

【PRI】同盟を動かすのは誰か――首脳の相性と外交官の「壁打ち」

在米ジャーナリスト 髙濱  賛  (Tato Takahama)
Pacific Research Institute
2026年11月19日

米韓同盟をめぐる一つの論考が、日米関係についても考えるきっかけを与えてくれた。

米国のシンクタンク、韓国経済研究所(KEI)に掲載されたダニエル・スナイダー氏の論文「米韓同盟は常に、その管理者たちに支えられてきた」(The U.S.-South Korea Alliance Has Always Depended on Its Managers)である。

スナイダー氏が問いかけているのは、同盟を本当に支えているのは何なのか、という問題だ。

米韓同盟は、相互防衛条約と在韓米軍だけで成り立ってきたわけではない。外交官、軍人、情報機関の担当者、国家安全保障会議(NSC)のスタッフなど、両国の間に立ち、日々の摩擦を処理してきた実務者たちがいた。彼らが相手国の政治事情を理解し、危機が起きるたびに連絡を取り合い、妥協点を探ってきたからこそ、同盟は幾度もの難局を乗り越えられたという。

スナイダー氏は、駐韓米大使を務めた父リチャード・スナイダー氏の経験を引きながら、1970年代の米韓関係を振り返る。朴正熙政権の秘密核開発計画、北朝鮮との緊張、カーター政権による在韓米軍撤退構想。米韓関係は決して平穏ではなかった。それでも、同盟の現場を知る人々が連絡と調整を続け、危機を管理した。

父リチャード氏は、もともと日本を専門とする職業外交官だった。東京の米大使館で首席公使を務め、沖縄返還交渉にも携わった。国務省では日本担当のカントリー・ディレクターを経て、東アジア・太平洋担当の国務次官補代理に就き、1974年に駐韓大使となった。米韓同盟の管理を論じる息子の論考には、父親が日米関係の現場で培った経験も重なっている。

スナイダー氏が懸念するのは、現在の米国で、そうした経験を持つ外交・安全保障の専門家が失われつつあることだ。国務省やNSCから経験豊かな人材が減り、同盟を日々動かす管理能力が弱くなっている。大統領が同盟国の首脳と親しく付き合っていても、その下で両国をつなぐ人材と仕組みが衰えれば、同盟は不安定になる。

これは米韓関係だけの話ではない。日米同盟にもそのまま当てはまる。

私はかつて、日米交渉の現場を知る岡本行夫氏から、レーガン大統領と中曽根康弘首相の関係について話を聞いたことがある。

岡本氏は、レーガン氏の中曽根氏に対する考えは「一種の宗教のようなものだった」と語ったことがある。日米間に難しい問題が持ち上がっても、米側から日本の立場に配慮した提案が出てくることがあったという。

単に二人の仲がよかったという話ではない。米国大統領が日本の首相を深く信頼していると、交渉の場で相手国の事情を考慮する姿勢にも影響が及ぶ。岡本氏は外交の現場で、その作用を見ていたのではないか。

岡本氏は外務省の安全保障課長を務め、日米安保交渉の実務に携わった人物である。退官後は自らコンサルティング事務所を設立し、政府の内外で外交政策に関わった。テレビや新聞でもおなじみの外交評論家だった。2020年、新型コロナウイルス感染症で急逝した。

1980年代前半の日米関係には、貿易摩擦や防衛負担をめぐる問題があった。米国側には、日本の市場開放や防衛努力が不十分だという不満があった。日本側にも、米国の要求をそのまま受け入れるわけにはいかない事情があった。

1983年1月、中曽根首相は訪米し、レーガン大統領と会談した。米側の記録によれば、レーガン氏は貿易と防衛をめぐる懸案について、中曽根氏との会談を経て解決に向けた前向きな勢いが生まれたと述べている。日本の外交青書も、この訪問で両首脳が個人的な信頼関係を築いたと記録した。

もちろん、親密な関係があったからといって、日米間の利害対立が消えたわけではない。だが、相手の政治的な立場を理解し、難しい問題を持ち込んでも話し合える関係があれば、交渉の進め方は変わる。岡本氏の証言は、首脳間の信頼が実務者の交渉を後押しすることを示している。

首脳同士の関係が外交を前に進めた例は、トランプ大統領と安倍晋三首相にも見られた。

安倍氏は2016年の米大統領選直後、トランプ氏が大統領に就任する前にニューヨークで会談した。各国首脳に先駆けて直接会い、ゴルフなどを通じて個人的な関係を築いた。トランプ氏の発言や政策が予測しにくいなか、安倍氏は首脳同士が直接話し合える回路を確保した。

トランプ氏は同盟国にも厳しい要求を突きつけた。日本に対しても、防衛費の負担や通商問題で圧力をかけた。安倍氏はそのつど、米国との関係を維持しながら日本の立場を説明した。個人的な信頼関係が、日米間の摩擦を管理するうえで一定の役割を果たしたことは否定できない。

ただし、首脳同士の関係がうまくいかなかった例もある。オバマ大統領と鳩山由紀夫首相の関係だ。

2009年に民主党政権が発足すると、鳩山首相は「東アジア共同体」構想を掲げ、アジアの国々、とりわけ中国との関係を重視する姿勢を打ち出した。鳩山氏は米国のアジアにおける役割を否定したわけではない。本人も、日米同盟を日本外交の基軸と位置づけていた。しかし、米国への依存を見直し、アジアを重視する外交を進めようとする姿勢は、ワシントンに警戒感を生んだ。

そこに沖縄の普天間飛行場移設問題が重なった。

鳩山氏は選挙中、「最低でも県外」と訴え、政権発足後は従来の日米合意を見直す方針を示した。沖縄の負担を軽減したいという問題意識そのものは理解できる。しかし、移設先をめぐる政府内の調整は難航し、米側との協議も進まなかった。鳩山首相は2009年11月のオバマ大統領との会談で、普天間問題について「私を信じてほしい」と伝えたとされる。ところが、その後も日本側の方針は定まらず、約束した期限までに解決の道筋を示せなかった。

2010年4月12日、ワシントンで開かれた核安全保障サミットの夕食会の際、両首脳は非公式に会話を交わした。時間は約10分。米紙ワシントン・ポストが報じたところでは、オバマ大統領は鳩山首相に、日米間にはもう時間がないという趣旨を伝え、約束を実行できるのかと問いただしたという。

首脳会談の時間の長短だけで、二人の関係を判断することはできない。しかし、この10分間のやり取りは、日米間の信頼がどこまで損なわれていたかを象徴していた。

鳩山氏のアジア外交、とりわけ中国との関係を重視する姿勢が米側の警戒を招いたことは確かだろう。だが、オバマ政権との関係を悪化させた直接の焦点は、普天間問題をめぐる日本政府の方針の揺れと、首相が約束したことを実行できるのかという疑念だった。

この時期の米側の対日政策を担った一人が、国務省東アジア・太平洋担当のカート・キャンベル国務次官補だった。

ドン・カイザー元米国務省東アジア・太平洋局首席国務次官補代理は、自民党政権との関係を中心に日本外交に携わってきたキャンベル氏がオバマ大統領の鳩山政権に対する見方を形づくるうえで、重要な役割を果たしたのではないかと見る。

カイザー氏は、32年間にわたり国務省に勤務し、北京の米大使館に3回、東京に2回赴任した。中国、台湾、日本、朝鮮半島など東アジア外交を専門とするキャリア外交官だ。

新政権の鳩山氏が打ち出した外交方針や普天間問題への対応を、ワシントンがどう受け止めるか。その認識の形成にキャンベル氏の経験や見方が影響した可能性はある。

ここに、首脳同士の相性を考えるうえで大切な教訓がある。首脳の相性は、外交の飾りではない。しかし、相性を支えるのは、相手国の政策と約束に対する信頼でもある。個人的に親しくなろうとしても、政府の方針が定まらず、約束が実行されなければ、信頼関係は続かない。

日米同盟の管理を担ってきた人材にも、時代による変化があった。リチャード・アーミテージ氏は共和党政権で同盟を支え、その周囲には後に日米関係を担う人材が集まった。民主党政権ではカート・キャンベル氏が重要な役割を果たした。キャンベル氏もまた、アーミテージ氏の薫陶を受けた一人だとカイザー氏は指摘する。党派は違っても、日米同盟を支える人材の間には、政策と経験の連続性があった。

ブッシュ大統領と小泉純一郎首相の関係も、首脳二人だけで築かれたものではない。ブッシュ氏は小泉氏を好み、尊敬していた。しかし、アーミテージ氏やパウエル国務長官らが日米関係を支え、必要なときにはその関係を擁護していた。首脳間の親密さを、同盟の政策に結びつける人々がいたのである。

リチャード・スナイダー大使の時代、日米同盟の管理は主として国務省の日本担当課長、東京の米大使館の首席公使、日本・韓国担当の国務次官補代理、東アジア・太平洋担当の国務次官補といった職業外交官が担っていた。時代が下るにつれ、実際の意思決定の重心は官僚機構の上層へ移り、アーミテージ氏やキャンベル氏のような政治任用者の影響力が強まった。経験と専門知識を備え、同盟の意味を理解する政治任用者がその役割を担うなら、それも一つの形だった。

そして現在、トランプ氏の相手は高市早苗首相である。

トランプ氏は高市氏への評価を隠さない。高市氏が自民党総裁に選ばれた際に祝意を伝え、2026年2月の衆院選では高市氏への支持を公然と表明した。選挙で自民党が大勝すると祝福し、3月の首脳会談でも高市氏を「非常に人気があり、力のある女性」と評した。トランプ氏は、高市氏について安倍氏から事前に好意的な話を聞いていたとも語っている。

トランプ氏は高市氏を安倍氏の後継者として見ているのか。少なくとも、安倍氏を通じて高市氏に親近感を持っていたことはうかがえる。高市氏の政治力を評価し、選挙での勝利を公然と称賛するトランプ氏の態度は、首脳間の関係が外交に影響することを改めて示している。

ただし、トランプ氏が高市氏を褒めていることと、米国の政策が日本の立場に配慮したものになることは同じではない。安倍氏との関係があったからといって、高市氏がそのまま同じ外交上の資産を引き継げるとも限らない。首脳間の親密さが、実際の政策にどこまで反映されるのか。これからの交渉が試金石になる。

カイザー氏が現在のトランプ政権について懸念するのは、まさにその先である。ベッセント財務長官、ラトニック商務長官、へグセス国防長官にはそれぞれに対日政策への考え方があるようだが、政権全体を貫く日本理解や対日戦略が見えないという。

ルビオ国務長官が日本にどれほど関心を持ち、政策に関与しているのかも判然としない。国務省の政治任用者たちも、独自の判断で政策を動かすというより、ホワイトハウスからの指示を待っているだけではないか。これがカイザー氏の厳しい見立てである。

カイザー氏はまた、トランプ政権下で国務省やCIAの職業人材が大量に去り、同盟管理を担う専門家が弱体化していると懸念する。第二次政権の最初の一年で約2,500人の職業外交官が退職に追い込まれたとも聞いているという。ただし、この数字は独立した裏付けが必要であり、ここでは確定した事実として扱わない。問題は数字だけではない。長年にわたって相手国を担当し、政権が交代しても蓄積した知識を引き継いできた人々が、政策決定の場からいなくなれば、同盟を管理する力そのものが損なわれる。

外交の現場では、首脳会談の前に膨大な作業が行われている。外務省と国務省、国防当局、情報機関、首相官邸とホワイトハウスの担当者が、何度も話し合い、相手の出方を探り、譲れるところと譲れないところを整理する。私はこれを、官僚同士の「壁打ち」と呼びたい。

外交官や実務者は、相手国の事情を読み、交渉の落としどころを探る。彼らの仕事がなければ、首脳会談のテーブルに合意案は載らない。だが、最後に政治的な判断を下し、国民に説明し、相手国の指導者と決着をつけるのは首脳である。

首脳同士の相性がよければ、実務者の交渉は進めやすくなる。首脳が信頼し合っていれば、難題が持ち込まれたときにも、相手の立場を考慮する余地が生まれる。岡本氏が語ったレーガン氏の中曽根氏に対する姿勢は、その一例だったのだろう。

だが、首脳の個人的な関係だけに同盟を預けるわけにはいかない。大統領も首相も交代する。個人的な友情は後任者に引き継げない。引き継がれるべきものは、実務者の専門知識と経験、政府間の連絡網、そして積み重ねられた信頼関係である。

スナイダー氏の論文は、同盟を支える人材と制度が弱まることへの警告である。岡本氏の証言は、その土台の上で首脳同士の信頼がどれほど大きな力を持つかを教えてくれる。オバマ・鳩山の時代は、政策と約束の不一致が首脳間の信頼を崩していく過程を示した。そしてカイザー氏の指摘は、トランプ・高市関係を支える米国側の人材と組織はどうなっているのか、という問いを投げかける。

外交官が壁打ちを重ね、首脳が最後の決断をする。だが、その壁打ちを担う人々がいなくなり、彼らの声が政権中枢に届かなくなれば、首脳の親密さだけでは同盟を動かせない。

首脳の相性は外交の飾りではない。しかし、それを国家間の信頼に変えるのは、専門知識を持つ人材と、政権が交代しても働き続ける外交の仕組みなのである。

参考文献・資料

  • Daniel C. Sneider, “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance Has Always Depended on Its Managers,” Korea Economic Institute of America, November 16, 2026.
    • U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Richard Lee Sneider”; Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, “Richard L. Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.”
    • U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting Between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone,” January 18, 1983.
    • Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1983.
    • Barack Obama and Yukio Hatoyama, Joint Press Conference, November 13, 2009.
    • The Washington Post, “Japan Moves to Ease Strain with U.S.,” April 24, 2010.
    • Congressional Research Service, “U.S.-Japan Relations Under the Obama and DPJ Administrations.”
    • Donald Trump, public endorsement of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, February 5, 2026; The White House, “Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae of Japan,” March 19, 2026.
    • Reuters, “Trump congratulates Japan's Takaichi on election win,” February 8, 2026.

 

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【PRI】Who Makes an Alliance Work? Personal Chemistry at the Top and the Diplomats Behind It

By Tato Takahama
Pacific Research Institute
November 19, 2026

An essay on the U.S.-South Korea alliance has prompted me to take another look at the relationship between Washington and Tokyo.

The essay, published by the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), is by Daniel Sneider and carries the title “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance Has Always Depended on Its Managers.”

Sneider raises a question that goes beyond the Korean Peninsula: What really holds an alliance together?

The U.S.-South Korea alliance has never rested solely on a mutual defense treaty or the presence of American troops. It has also depended on diplomats, military officers, intelligence officials and National Security Council staff members who work behind the scenes. They understand the politics on both sides, keep lines of communication open and work through disagreements before they become full-blown crises.

That machinery has helped the alliance survive some difficult periods.

Sneider draws on the experience of his father, Richard Sneider, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, to recall the strains of the 1970s. There was South Korean President Park Chung-hee's secret nuclear weapons program, rising tensions with North Korea and President Jimmy Carter's proposal to withdraw American troops from the peninsula. The relationship was hardly trouble-free. Yet experienced officials on both sides kept talking, weighing their options and looking for ways to prevent disagreements from damaging the alliance.

There is an important connection to Japan in his father's career. Richard Sneider was a career Foreign Service officer who specialized in Japan before becoming ambassador to South Korea. He served as deputy chief of mission in Tokyo, played a role in the negotiations that led to Okinawa's reversion to Japan, and later became deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Before that, he had served as the State Department's country director for Japan. His son's account of managing the U.S.-South Korea alliance is rooted in a diplomatic career that had also been deeply involved in the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Daniel Sneider's concern is that Washington is losing precisely the kind of people who made that work possible. Experienced diplomats and national security specialists are disappearing from the State Department and the National Security Council. A president may enjoy a warm personal relationship with a foreign leader, but that relationship cannot substitute for the people and institutions that manage an alliance day after day.

The same lesson applies to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

I once discussed the relationship between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone with Yukio Okamoto, who knew the mechanics of U.S.-Japan negotiations firsthand.

Okamoto told me that Reagan's regard for Nakasone was “almost like a religion.”

He was not simply describing two leaders who got along. He was talking about the effect a personal bond could have on the way Washington approached difficult negotiations. There were occasions when the American side came forward with proposals that took Japan's position into account, even when the two countries were at odds.

That observation has stayed with me.

Okamoto had served as director of the Security Affairs Division at Japan's Foreign Ministry and was involved in the practical business of managing the security relationship with the United States. After leaving government, he established his own consulting firm and continued to work on foreign policy issues. He later became a familiar voice on Japanese television and in the press. He died in 2020 after contracting COVID-19.

The early 1980s were hardly free of friction between Washington and Tokyo. Trade disputes persisted, and American officials wanted Japan to open its markets and do more for its own defense. Japanese leaders, meanwhile, had political constraints of their own and could not simply accept every American demand.

When Nakasone visited Washington in January 1983, he and Reagan discussed these issues directly. According to the U.S. government's official memorandum of their January 18 meeting, Reagan emerged from his private conversation with Nakasone feeling that there was “positive momentum” toward resolving outstanding disputes, particularly over trade and defense. He also expressed appreciation for Nakasone's personal support.

The official record offers a glimpse of what Okamoto was describing. Personal trust did not eliminate differences between the two governments. It gave the leaders room to deal with them.

A similar dynamic emerged between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Shortly after Trump's victory in the 2016 presidential election, Abe traveled to New York to meet the president-elect, becoming one of the first foreign leaders to establish direct contact with him. Through repeated meetings and rounds of golf, the two developed a personal relationship.

Trump was unpredictable, and his demands on allies could be blunt. Japan was no exception. He pressed Tokyo over defense spending and trade. Abe had to explain Japan's position while keeping the relationship from becoming another source of friction. Their personal rapport provided a channel through which difficult issues could be addressed.

That does not mean the disagreements disappeared. But the relationship gave both leaders a way to handle them.

The opposite experience can be seen in the relationship between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama.

When Japan's Democratic Party took power in 2009, Hatoyama promoted the idea of an East Asian Community and called for a greater emphasis on Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors, particularly China. He was not rejecting the U.S.-Japan alliance. He continued to describe it as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy. But his desire to reconsider Japan's dependence on Washington raised questions in the Obama administration about where Tokyo intended to go.

Then came the dispute over the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa.

During the election campaign, Hatoyama had promised to move the facility “at least outside Okinawa Prefecture.” Once in office, he sought to revisit an existing agreement with Washington. His concern about the burden borne by Okinawa was understandable. But his government struggled to agree on an alternative site, and negotiations with the United States stalled.

At a November 2009 meeting with Obama, Hatoyama reportedly told the president, “Please trust me” on the Futenma issue. Yet his government could not settle on a workable plan by the deadline it had set.

The strain became unmistakable on April 12, 2010, during the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington. The two leaders had a private conversation lasting about ten minutes.

According to The Washington Post's account, Obama told Hatoyama that the two countries were running out of time and questioned whether the prime minister could deliver on his commitments.

The length of a meeting alone tells us little about a diplomatic relationship. But that ten-minute exchange captured how badly confidence between the two governments had deteriorated.

Hatoyama's interest in closer relations with China contributed to Washington's unease. Still, the immediate source of the breakdown was the uncertainty surrounding his government's handling of Futenma and the growing doubt that the prime minister could deliver what he had promised.

One of the officials shaping Washington's Japan policy at the time was Kurt Campbell, then assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Don believes Campbell may have played an important role in shaping Obama's view of Hatoyama and his administration. Campbell had spent much of his career dealing with Japan's more traditional Liberal Democratic Party governments. In Don's view, that background may have influenced how the Obama administration interpreted the new government's approach to the alliance and the Futenma dispute. This is an assessment of the internal dynamics of the administration, not an established account of Obama's decision-making.

The episode illustrates something that personal chemistry alone cannot overcome. A leader may want a close relationship with a foreign counterpart, but trust has to rest on more than personal warmth. A government must know what it wants, and its leader must be able to deliver on commitments.

The people responsible for managing the U.S.-Japan alliance have also changed over time. Richard Armitage played a central role in supporting the alliance under Republican administrations and helped cultivate a network of younger officials who would later work on Japan policy. Under Democratic administrations, Kurt Campbell became one of the key figures. Don points out that Campbell, too, was a protégé of Armitage. Despite their different party affiliations, the two men represented a degree of continuity in the people and ideas supporting the alliance.

The relationship between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also depended on more than the personal chemistry between the two leaders. Bush genuinely liked and respected Koizumi. But without Armitage, Secretary of State Colin Powell and others working to support and defend the U.S.-Japan relationship, the personal bond between Bush and Koizumi would not, by itself, have been enough.

In Richard Sneider's time, management of the Japan alliance rested largely with career diplomats: the country director for Japan at the State Department, the deputy chief of mission in Tokyo, the deputy assistant secretary responsible for Japan and Korea, and the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Over time, the center of decision-making moved higher in the bureaucracy, giving political appointees such as Armitage and Campbell greater influence. That arrangement could work when those appointees brought experience, expertise, seriousness and an understanding of the alliance.

Today, Trump's counterpart in Tokyo is Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

Trump has made no secret of his favorable view of her. When Takaichi was selected as president of the Liberal Democratic Party, he congratulated her. Ahead of Japan's February 2026 general election, he publicly endorsed her. After her party's sweeping victory, he offered his congratulations. At their March 19 summit, he described her as “a very popular, powerful woman” and praised her leadership.

Trump also said that Abe had spoken favorably about Takaichi before his death.

Does Trump see Takaichi as Abe's political heir? That may be going too far. But his remarks suggest that Abe's favorable impression of her helped establish a degree of personal familiarity before the two leaders met.

Still, Trump's praise of Takaichi should not be confused with a guarantee that American policy will accommodate Japan's interests. Whatever personal goodwill she may have inherited from Abe, she must establish her own working relationship with Trump. The real test will come when the two governments have to negotiate difficult issues.

Don's concern is what lies behind that relationship. He sees no coherent administration-wide understanding of Japan or strategy toward it. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has one approach, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick another, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth yet another. Don sees little evidence that Secretary of State Marco Rubio is personally engaged with Japan. Nor does he see State Department political appointees with enough authority or influence to shape policy. In his view, they wait for the latest instruction from the White House.

Don is also concerned about the loss of career expertise across the U.S. government. He says that large numbers of experienced people have left or been pushed out of the State Department and the CIA during Trump's second term. He has heard that roughly 2,500 career Foreign Service officers were forced out during the administration's first year. That figure requires independent verification and should not be treated as established fact here. The broader concern, however, goes beyond any single number. When officials who have spent years learning another country and managing the relationship disappear, the government loses institutional memory and the ability to anticipate how decisions will affect an alliance.

Behind every summit is a considerable amount of work that rarely makes the headlines.

Officials at the Japanese and American foreign ministries, defense establishments, intelligence agencies, the prime minister's office and the White House talk repeatedly before their leaders sit down together. They test proposals, anticipate objections and work out what each side can accept and what it cannot.

I call this process the diplomats' “back-and-forth.”

These officials do more than exchange talking points. They must understand the domestic political pressures facing the other government, read the signals coming from its leadership and find room for compromise. Without their work, there would be little to put on the table when the leaders meet.

But the final decision belongs to the political leaders. They must take responsibility for the outcome, explain it to their own people and reach an understanding with the other country's leader.

A good personal relationship can make the officials' work easier. When two leaders trust each other, there is more room to consider the other side's difficulties when a dispute arises. Okamoto's account of Reagan's regard for Nakasone is a case in point.

Yet no alliance can depend on personal friendships alone. Presidents and prime ministers leave office. The relationships they build do not automatically pass on to their successors. What can endure are experienced officials, institutional memory, established channels of communication and the trust built through years of working together.

Sneider's essay is a warning about what happens when that foundation begins to disappear. Okamoto's recollection reminds us how much personal trust between leaders can add to it. The Obama-Hatoyama experience shows how quickly that trust can erode when a government cannot deliver on its promises. And Don's observations raise a further question about the Trump-Takaichi relationship: who, within the American government, is doing the work to sustain it?

Diplomats do the groundwork. Leaders make the final call. But when the people responsible for that groundwork are gone—or when their voices no longer reach the center of decision-making—a personal bond between two leaders cannot carry an alliance on its own.

Personal chemistry matters. What turns it into a durable alliance is the expertise of those who manage the relationship and the institutions that keep working when administrations change.

References

  • Daniel C. Sneider, “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance Has Always Depended on Its Managers,” Korea Economic Institute of America, November 16, 2026.
    • U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Richard Lee Sneider”; Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, “Richard L. Sneider, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.”
    • U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting Between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone,” January 18, 1983.
    • Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook, 1983.
    • Barack Obama and Yukio Hatoyama, Joint Press Conference, November 13, 2009.
    • The Washington Post, “Japan Moves to Ease Strain with U.S.,” April 24, 2010.
    • Congressional Research Service, “U.S.-Japan Relations Under the Obama and DPJ Administrations.”
    • Donald Trump, public endorsement of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, February 5, 2026; The White House, “Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae of Japan,” March 19, 2026.
    • Reuters, “Trump congratulates Japan's Takaichi on election win,” February 8, 2026.

Note: English translation was prepared by the author. Translation assistance tools may have been used.


 

This article is part of “A Japanese View from America,” a column by Tato Takahama.

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